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Abstract
The crisis in Darfur led to one of the most powerful advocacy campaigns in recent 
US history. Responding to intense political pressures from this campaign, the US 
engaged Sudan in a heated public confrontation, increasingly echoing the rhetoric 
of an advocacy campaign that was surprisingly indifferent to realities on the ground 
in Darfur. This article examines how the exceptional mobilization around Darfur 
affected US policy and diplomatic outcomes, using the case to explore larger 
theoretical questions around deception and truthfulness in International Relations. 
There was a curious disconnect between the exceptionally strong language US 
leaders used during the crisis, and the failure of these public claims, promises and 
threats to achieve the desired diplomatic outcomes. Such strong language should 
have bolstered US arguments to persuade allies to support measures against Sudan, 
given the US bargaining leverage with Sudan, and opened opportunities for activists 
to rhetorically entrap US officials into defending the norms they publicly invoked. 
Instead, I argue that US leaders bullshitted their way through the crisis in response 
to advocacy and the demands it generated. Far from being a harmless form of moral 
posturing, this complicated US diplomatic efforts and undermined the prospects for 
a political solution in Darfur.
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Introduction
In mid-2003, the government of Sudan responded to an escalating rebellion in Darfur 
with shocking violence. The first news reports of killing in the spring of 2004 coincided 
with the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, drawing massive media coverage, 
Congressional lobbying and grassroots activism that launched one of the most powerful 
advocacy campaigns in recent US history. The campaign was premised on the thesis that 
‘the battle to prevent genocide has been lost in the realm of domestic politics’ (Power, 
2003: 509). Stopping genocide thus required activism targeting the government to create 
political costs and moral stigma for inaction. The largest organization in this campaign, 
the Save Darfur Coalition, eventually comprised a membership of 180 faith-based 
groups, 1000 community groups, a million activists and a contingent of Hollywood 
celebrities (Thomas-Jensen and Spiegel, 2007/2008: 849). The campaign organized ral-
lies headlined by celebrities, sent one million postcards to the White House demanding 
action, sold green wristbands with the slogan ‘Save Darfur: Not on Our Watch’, kept tab 
of legislators’ votes and lobbied for Darfur-specific appropriations and legislation. The 
campaign relied on simplifications to render Darfur’s complexities in terms that would 
encourage and sustain public engagement, framing the conflict in terms of ongoing geno-
cide long after one-sided mass killing had stopped.
Responding to intense political pressures from this campaign, the US engaged Sudan 
in a heated public confrontation, increasingly echoing the rhetoric of this powerful advo-
cacy campaign. The US extended sanctions while threatening further measures, coordi-
nated international pressure and played an important role mediating between the rebels 
and the Sudanese government. Yet the Sudanese government generally prevailed in these 
diplomatic contests. Sudan successfully played for time, reduced the impact of policies 
that ran counter to its interests and delayed the deployment of a more robust international 
presence in Darfur. The conflict remains unresolved.
Why was US diplomacy so ineffective during the crisis? This article examines how 
the exceptional mobilization around Darfur affected US policy and diplomatic outcomes, 
using the case to explore larger theoretical questions around deception and truthfulness 
in International Relations (IR). There was a curious disconnect between the exception-
ally strong language US leaders used during the crisis, and the failure of these public 
claims, promises and threats to achieve the desired diplomatic outcomes. Such strong 
language should have bolstered US arguments to persuade allies to support measures 
against Sudan, given the US bargaining leverage with Sudan, and opened opportunities 
for activists to rhetorically entrap US officials into defending the norms they publicly 
invoked. Instead, I argue that US leaders effectively bullshitted (BS) their way through 
the crisis in response to advocacy and the demands it generated. Far from being a harm-
less form of moral posturing, this complicated US diplomatic efforts and undermined the 
prospects for a political solution in Darfur.
The article begins by defining bullshitting (BSing) and discussing how it differs from 
lying and hypocrisy. BS is pervasive in international politics, yet has received little theo-
retical attention. I attempt to understand it as a social practice with a different logic and 
expectations about truthfulness than the dominant discursive interactions in IR theory. 
The article then explains how BS potentially undermines the mechanisms and distorts 
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the purposes that make for effective arguing, bargaining and rhetorical action. The sec-
ond section examines US foreign policy around Darfur to show how this matters. Under 
the pressure of a powerful advocacy campaign, and constrained by commitments in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, US leaders were frequently indifferent to facts in managing impres-
sions regarding their commitment to defending the values at stake in Darfur. While it 
proved relatively harmless at home, this dissembling exacted diplomatic consequences 
abroad. I conclude with the theoretical and normative implications of thinking harder 
about truthfulness. We ought to pay far more attention to truth, deception and BS given 
their implications for how we think about IR theory and for the normative value we 
attach to truth more generally.
The performative logic of bullshitting
There are varieties of untruthfulness in politics, perhaps especially in diplomacy. I have 
in mind a type of dissembling closest to what Harry Frankfurt (2005) defines as bullshit-
ting. This has two elements: the first is ‘indifference to truth’, which deals with content; 
the second is the ‘intention to convey a misleading impression’ and concerns purposes.1 
Thus, substantively, the speaker’s statements are indifferent to truth, but not necessarily 
false. The veracity of what is said matters only so far as it relates to the speaker’s interest 
in accomplishing his purpose, which is to shape how people think of him. His perfor-
mance must maintain the pretence of conveying information, hiding his lack of justifica-
tion for this information from the audience, and perhaps even from himself, in order to 
make the right sort of impression. It is a performance guided by ‘impression manage-
ment’ in which the boundaries between contrived, deceptive representations and genu-
ine, earnest representations are not always apparent to the audience or even the speaker 
(Goffman, 1959).
A number of factors make us susceptible to BSing that exploits our vulnerability to 
self- and collective deception (Bailey, 1991; Smith, 2007; Trivers, 2011), particularly 
when an issue engages emotions and self-image and causes us to misread evidence that 
might affirm inconvenient truths (Mele, 2001). BS often invokes ‘frames’ that constitute 
identities, interests, and assumptions taken as truths that ‘authorize, enable, and justify 
specific practices and policies while precluding others’ (Autesserre, 2009: 255). While 
BS can be cynical, it tends to be most effective when it responds to the strenuous social 
criteria of sincerity and authenticity (Trilling, 1970). This tends to shift the discussion 
from objective facts to subjective beliefs, not least because it is harder to falsify state-
ments about personal values than those about the state of affairs — especially when the 
speaker is sincere about holding these values, we share them with him and we want to 
believe that they are true. Comedian Stephen Colbert has satirized this as the hollow 
earnestness of ‘truthiness’ — something we want to be true and that we feel intuitively 
to be true regardless of the facts. Uncritical or ignorant audiences are also more likely to 
be deceived when authoritative elites and celebrities dissemble, especially when abetted 
and encouraged by uncritical media. Taken together, these mechanisms mean that BSing 
is far more likely to be effective with domestic audiences for whom the frames and ide-
ologies resonate. Foreigners and distrustful segments of the domestic audience, on the 
other hand, are far more likely to be sceptical, seeing phoniness rather than earnestness.
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Deception and diplomacy: Lying, hypocrisy and bullshitting
Among categories of dissembling, recent work on deception has focused on lying and 
hypocrisy. John Mearsheimer’s recent book (2011: 106) even disregards BSing as a sig-
nificant category of deceptive behaviour in international politics. He claims, first, that 
statesmen are seldom required to speak on matters of which they are ignorant, and, sec-
ond, that people are able to easily recognize BS. But Mearsheimer underestimates the 
endemic nature of ignorance in decision-making, and overestimates our ability to detect 
BS, whether other people’s or our own.2 Though overlaps between lying, hypocrisy and 
BSing complicate the typology, they can be distinguished in ways that help identify the 
distinct outcomes each produces.
Liars, hypocrites and BSers all pretend to be engaged in conveying true information 
and are successful to the extent that they deceive others. But there are important differ-
ences. Mearsheimer defines lying as ‘when a person makes a statement that he knows or 
suspects to be false in the hope that others will think it true’ (2011: 16). The liar uses 
falsehoods to deceive an audience about the veracity of particular statements or facts. 
But whereas lying is about falsity, BSing is about fakery: the speaker’s pretence of con-
cern for the truth is fake, but what is said is not necessarily false. ‘Telling a lie is an act 
with a sharp focus’, explains Frankfurt, ‘It is designed to insert a particular falsehood at 
a specific point in a set or system of beliefs, in order to avoid the consequences of having 
that point occupied by the truth. … [A] person who undertakes to bullshit his way through 
has more freedom’ (2005: 51). Unlike lying, the successful deception in BSing is not in 
misleading the audience about the particular facts. Rather, it is successful when one mis-
leads the audience — and perhaps even oneself — about one’s indifference to the distinc-
tion between true or false, and misrepresents the broader context for the exchange, 
focusing on conveying an impression while pretending to do something else.
This emphasis on fakery places BS close to hypocrisy. Both attempt to mislead, often 
through moralistic proclamations that bear on actor identities, and involve the ‘construc-
tion of a persona that generates some kind of false impression’ (Runciman, 2008: 9). Yet 
there are important differences. Martha Finnemore defines hypocrisy in terms of three 
elements: ‘First, the actor’s actions are at odds with its proclaimed values. Second, alter-
native actions are available. Third, the actor is likely trying to deceive others about the 
mismatch between its actions and values’ (Finnemore, 2009: 75).3 What is at stake in 
hypocrisy is the inconsistency between ‘the virtue of what we say and the venality of 
what we do’ (Finnemore, 2009: 73). By comparison, what is at stake in BSing is the 
inconsistency between the pretence of our concern for the truth and our actual indiffer-
ence to it. Both are instances of impression management, but for different ends: when 
hypocritical, because we want to hide what we actually do; when BSing, to hide the lack 
of justification for our statements. One gets away with hypocrisy when one cynically 
deceives others about the conflict between actions and commitments. Sincerity is thus 
antithetical to hypocrisy. To escape the charge of hypocrisy, our actions must be seen to 
correspond to our prior commitments and proclaimed values, though an actor possessing 
deep legitimacy can sometimes get away with hypocrisy if ‘others believe deeply in the 
value claims that legitimate its power’ (Finnemore, 2009: 83). Conversely, sincerity is 
often the cause of BS that seeks to convey an earnest representation. An actor gets away 
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with BSing when the audience perceives this representation as sincere, or if they deceive 
themselves about the actor’s indifference to facts, perhaps knowing that what is said has 
no basis in fact but earnestly wishing for it to be so (Frankfurt, 2005: 65).
The ways we judge liars, hypocrites and BSers also varies. Lying tends to be con-
demned when leaders lie to their citizens. However, the expectation of deception in for-
eign policy means that leaders tend not to be judged too harshly for lying in pursuit of 
national interests (Mearsheimer, 2011: 86). Hypocrisy tends to be condemned by those 
with an interest in exposing the contradictions between an actor’s proclaimed values and 
actions, generally other states and foreign publics. Those benefiting from hypocritical 
violations of rules and norms domestically tend to be far more generous, seeing hypoc-
risy as a way of honouring the rules in the breach (Bukovansky, 2010). BS is treated 
differently. Whereas statements exposed as lies or hypocrisies potentially damage a 
state’s reputation and legitimacy abroad, the social sanctions for BSing are lower. At 
home, many citizens are unlikely to notice, while those who do are likely to dismiss it as 
hot air. Abroad, BS does not provoke the same sense of indignation as lies, and is judged 
far less harshly than hypocrisy, possibly because it tends to be aimed at domestic audi-
ences and involves ignorance of reality rather than the distortion of it.
All three forms of dissimulative rhetoric potentially legitimize untruthfulness, erode 
the quality of public debate and thus harm civic life. Sensible policy depends on leaders’ 
respect for the distinction between true and false; democratic accountability depends on 
the ability of publics to discern the difference. For this reason, we tend to be on guard for 
untruthfulness, both our own and others’. But tolerance of BS makes it dangerous by 
generating possibilities for individual and collective self-deception. Liars have to main-
tain a firm hold on the truth and hypocrites need to be aware of the realities they hope to 
disguise. It is the disarming combination of sincerity and looseness with the truth, how-
ever, that renders BSers especially prone to self-deception and leaves their audience 
vulnerable to collective deception.
A long line of thinking alerts us to the dangers of dissembling and BSing as defined 
here. Truth was also an important concern of classical realists, who realized that leaders 
had to deceive in order to legitimate their positions to the public and to themselves, but 
warned of the dangers of leaders and the public misleading themselves. On the one hand, 
E.H. Carr advocated deception in the service of higher ends. He regarded diplomacy in 
terms of the systematic manipulation of meanings — and not incidentally, worked on 
British propaganda at the outset of World War II (Jones, 1998: 14). On the other, he was 
a relentless critic of the tendency of statesmen to be taken in by their own deceptions and 
of publics to idly follow (Carr, 1939). Hans Morgenthau thought misrepresentations 
were intimately linked to the pursuit of prestige and power through propaganda and ide-
ology. Yet he considered moralizing public diplomacy as a worrying development: 
‘Public diplomats speak to the world rather than to each other. Their aim is not to per-
suade each other that they could find common ground for agreement, but to persuade the 
world and especially their own nations that they are right and the other side is wrong and 
that they are and always will remain staunch defenders of the right’ (1948: 375). Like 
Carr, Morgenthau worried that the struggle for power led people to delusion, as these 
simplifications blind them to their own ignorance. Simplifying ideologies make the pur-
suit of power psychologically acceptable to those engaged in it and endow foreign policy 
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Table 1. Predominant social logics, truthfulness and communication.
Communicative
action Bargaining Rhetorical action BSing
Logic Arguing Consequences Appropriateness Performance
Truthfulness Truth-telling Lying Hypocrisy Indifference
Content Genuine validity 
claims about  
truth and normative 
rightness
Promises, threats 
and information, 
whether true  
and false
Manipulated  
claims about 
normative rightness
Claims, threats and 
promises, whether 
true or false, 
especially about 
values
Purpose To persuade; 
reach a reasoned 
consensus  
through 
deliberation
To agree;  
maximize gains 
through joint 
action
To persuade 
audience; 
maximize gains 
through rhetorical 
entrapment
To impress; affect 
perceptions 
through (mis-)
representation
Causal 
mechanism
Trust Credibility Shaming Self-/collective 
deception
Scope 
conditions
Consensus-seeking; 
willingness to be 
persuaded;  
common life  
world
Agreement- 
seeking to 
maximize gains; 
instrumentally 
rational
Seek to change 
behaviour; 
audience perceives 
inconsistencies; 
target cares about 
norms at stake
Impression-
seeking; ignorance 
or indifference; 
emotions engaged
with moral legitimacy, but lead to a potentially reckless indifference to the truth and the 
pursuit of misleading priorities (Morgenthau, 1948: 99–101). Hannah Arendt (1971) 
lamented policymakers’ ‘truly amazing and entirely honest ignorance of the historically 
pertinent background’, which she credited to our ‘active, aggressive’ capabilities of self-
deception: ‘Whoever reflects on these matters can only be surprised by how little atten-
tion has been paid … to their significance, on the one hand for the nature of action and, 
on the other, for the nature of our ability to deny in thought and word whatever happens 
to be the case.’ The pertinent danger is less that we linguistically construct alternative 
realities based on self-serving facts, and more that we embark on a linguistic flight from 
reality and lose sight of the importance of facts altogether.
Arguing, rhetorical action, bargaining and bullshitting
Discursive processes involve multiple logics. Speakers shift the content, audiences and 
purposes of their speech while moving closer to the truth or further from it. But disentan-
gling these processes conceptually helps us locate the mechanisms and scope conditions 
that make each speech act effective. Each reflects a different orientation towards truth-
fulness and a predominant social logic: communicative action to truth and a logic of 
arguing; bargaining to lying and a logic of consequences; rhetorical action to hypocrisy 
and a logic of appropriateness (see Table 1).4 Below, I argue that BSing, with its indiffer-
ence to truth and performative logic, represents a type of discourse that works to the 
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detriment of persuasion, bargaining and rhetorical action, before demonstrating how 
these processes played out in the case of Darfur.
Arguing, premised on Habermas’s theory of communicative action, consists of genu-
ine validity claims regarding what is objectively true or morally right. The purpose is 
persuasion, which helps participants reach a ‘reasoned consensus’. Research suggests 
that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can increase the likelihood of diplomatic 
persuasion by framing the issue, introducing arguments and invoking existing norms and 
understandings (Deitelhoff, 2009). A key causal mechanism is the trust participants have 
in one another to tell the truth. Important scope conditions thus include the sincerity of 
participants, their willingness to be persuaded and a common life world of shared under-
standings and interpretations that defines the boundaries of legitimate argument and gen-
erates trust (Crawford, 2009; Risse, 2000).
Bargaining involves promises, threats and strategically conveyed information, aiming 
for agreements that divide the gains of joint action (Powell, 2002). Given asymmetric 
information, actors expect one another to lie, making it hard to establish credibility. 
However, actors can use costly signalling and hand-tying to convey information, bolster 
credibility and increase leverage. Thus, actors in international bargaining can manipulate 
domestic constraints to increase leverage in ‘two-level games’, either by making public 
threats that generate audience costs if leaders back down (Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007), or 
by claiming that their hands are tied by those whose support is required for a particular 
foreign policy (Putnam, 1988). Likewise, a mediator’s ability to bring about a negotiated 
peace settlement should increase with his ability to make credible threats and promises 
to the belligerents, particularly when biased towards one side or committed to the issue 
(Favretto, 2009; Kydd, 2003).
In rhetorical action, strategically motivated actors use a logic of appropriateness to 
their advantage. Actors manipulate norms-based arguments to change behaviour through 
social shaming exposing hypocrisy. Arguments that are more truthful tend to be more 
powerful, but even false arguments can be effective when the speaker is credible and can 
devise a compelling frame for the audience that exposes prior normative commitments to 
the test of hypocrisy (Hurd, 2005; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Morin and Gold, 2010; 
Schimmelfennig, 2001). Key scope conditions include the willingness of the audience to 
be persuaded, their perception of inconsistencies between words and deeds, and the 
extent to which the target cares about its reputation and the norms at stake.
BSing relies on a performative logic in which impressions are paramount. Though 
one might pretend to be attempting to persuade others or reach agreements with them, 
the impression is an end in itself and not — as in arguing and bargaining — a means to 
an end. Claims, promises and threats are conveyed without concern for their credibility, 
and norms are invoked to attach one’s identity to them rather than to defend them. In 
emphasizing the limits to rationality, BSing raises issues of cognitive bias and fallible 
reasoning that set it apart from reasoned argument, instrumental bargaining and strategic 
shaming. BSing often works to the detriment of the same mechanisms upon which argu-
ing, bargaining and rhetorical action rely: words lose their persuasiveness as partners 
reject the validity of arguments and cease to trust one another; credibility erodes as bar-
gaining partners realize the search for agreement is a cover for conveying impressions; 
and as the audience focuses on values honestly invoked rather than actions inconsistent 
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with them, it becomes harder to shame by exposing cynical hypocrisy. In terms of scope 
conditions, BSing is likely to be effective in complex situations where ignorance and 
indifference are widespread, especially where collective values and identity are impli-
cated, and where the ostensible search for consensus or agreement is a lower priority 
than the need to impress.
When viewed in terms of these discursive processes, the Darfur crisis poses a number 
of theoretical puzzles. First, why was the US unable to persuade allies to support its poli-
cies at key turning points? Despite the power of activists to shape US diplomacy, under-
standings of the situation and policy preferences in foreign capitals resisted Washington’s 
public arguments until activism in those countries caught up with the US campaign. 
Second, why did the US have so little leverage in negotiations with Sudan and media-
tions between the government and rebels? The mechanism of audience costs suggests 
that the public threats issued by US leaders were a form of costly signalling that should 
have increased leverage through audience costs, while politicization of the issue by a 
powerful advocacy campaign should have tied hands in ways that also enhanced lever-
age. These same mechanisms should have expanded the bargaining space between dis-
putants in ways that made a workable agreement more likely as obvious US bias towards 
the rebels and concern for the issues at stake became evident during mediation. However, 
the US failed to strike deals with Sudan at key turning points, the terms were unfavour-
able to the US in the few agreements eventually reached and US mediation proved 
unsuccessful in peace negotiations. Finally, with American leaders emphasizing the need 
for robust action to stop the violence, why were advocates unable to entrap them in their 
rhetoric? Despite the power and resources of the campaign around Darfur, activists were 
unable to shame officials into going beyond symbolic quick fixes, and advocacy did little 
to substantively affect policies relevant to improving the situation in Darfur beyond sus-
taining high levels of funding for humanitarian assistance.
Bullshitting over genocide in Darfur
These outcomes make much more sense when we recognize the role of BS. The puzzles 
above presume that when doing things with words, US leaders prioritized persuading 
allies and reaching agreements with the Sudanese government and rebels, and that their 
loaded language left them vulnerable to activist shaming. But as Darfur became entan-
gled in domestic politics, the response to the crisis in Washington increasingly became a 
performance concerned with impression management — to the detriment of these other 
discursive processes unfolding simultaneously. It is impossible to know whether an 
approach that resisted pressures to dissemble would have made US diplomacy more 
effective in meeting American aims and contributing to a political solution in Darfur. I 
argue, however, that the tendency to BS was unhelpful diplomatically and present evi-
dence supporting this interpretation in two important episodes: the debate over genocide 
and the pursuit of a protection force and peace agreement. In each, I first locate elements 
of BS in the response of US leaders to Darfur, and then examine how this affected paral-
lel processes of arguing, bargaining and relations between activists and US officials.
I concentrate on US policy not because dissembling was absent in the statements of 
other actors, not least the government of Sudan, though it relied more on lying and 
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hypocrisy. Nor do I focus on the US because other states were unimportant; Sudan’s 
neighbours, the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and China played key 
diplomatic roles alongside the US (Black and Williams, 2010). I focus on the US because 
it was the only actor that potentially combined the leverage and political will to compel 
Sudan to change its behaviour. My argument confronts two important inferential chal-
lenges. The first is how to identify types of discourse. While the mental processes that 
allow us to identify specific speech acts are unobservable (Krebs and Jackson, 2007), we 
can infer the relative priority of arguing, bargaining and BSing by observing what people 
say, gauging whether they base this on what they know to be true, and attempting to 
discern their purposes. US diplomacy might also have been less persuasive and credible 
because of lying and hypocrisy. I therefore focus on whether the relevant deceptions 
concern particular facts (lying), the gap between words and deeds (hypocrisy), or indif-
ference to facts (BS), and whether the deception is cynical (potentially all three) or sin-
cere (only BSing).
A second problem is how to isolate the causes of these outcomes and rule out alterna-
tive explanations for the ineffectiveness of US policy. First, the centrepiece of 
Washington’s Sudan policy for much of the past decade was a peace agreement to end the 
decades-long civil war in South Sudan, which was eventually signed on 9 January 2005. 
The desire to broker the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and see it implemented 
required a more cautious approach towards Sudan. A second factor was Sudan’s coopera-
tion on counter-terrorism, which also counselled against taking steps that would compli-
cate this intelligence channel. Third, Darfur exposed the limits of US power in the region. 
Sudan had been the target of US missile strikes in 1998. But the shadow of the war in 
Iraq, commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, and strained relations with other states lim-
ited Washington’s options, requiring attention to what was diplomatically possible. There 
were also problems of incoherence engendered by an interagency process that decentral-
ized control over Sudan policy across different dossiers, agencies and competing offi-
cials in Washington. While these factors posed obstacles largely beyond the control of 
US leaders, however, the tendency to BS was not, making it important to understand its 
independent effects. In addition, there is the larger argument that US diplomacy was not 
ineffective, but rather consistent with overall US interests in avoiding costly intervention 
in Darfur and realizing gains elsewhere. Yet this argument misses the extent to which 
BSing made it harder to attain outcomes that clearly were in the US interest in Darfur 
while complicating core US interests in counter-terror cooperation and implementation 
of the North–South peace process.
The failure to prevent atrocities and broker a political solution in Darfur was over-
determined and a significant part of the explanation can be linked to the factors listed 
above. Rather than constituting alternative explanations for the same outcomes, 
these factors can be seen as part of a political context that encouraged BSing to 
divert attention from contradictions and ineptitude in Washington’s Sudan policy, 
and reinforce a belief in US power and human rights leadership when both were 
clearly waning. Over time, however, rather than insulating US diplomacy from the 
demands of an activist campaign, a number of US leaders came to believe its delu-
sional claims and pursue its irrelevant policy fixes to the detriment of both US diplo-
macy and peace in Darfur.
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The genocide debate
The first media reports of atrocities in Darfur in the spring of 2004 coincided with the 
10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. Responding to a growing media outcry, leg-
islators passed a joint Congressional Resolution in July determining that events in Darfur 
were genocide and calling for action. After resisting calls to publicly declare Darfur a 
genocide for several months while engaging Sudan’s government on Darfur behind the 
scenes, the Bush administration relented. On 9 September 2004, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell declared ‘that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of 
Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility and genocide may still be occurring’. 
President Bush followed suit at the United Nations, stating that ‘the world is witnessing 
terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my govern-
ment has concluded are genocide’. Yet the accusation of genocide in Darfur was consist-
ently coupled with a refusal to commit to concrete actions. Internal deliberations in the 
State Department preceding the determination found that the Genocide Convention con-
ferred no real legal obligations on the US (Taft, 2004). Powell’s dramatic genocide alle-
gation thus included the disclaimer that ‘no new action is dictated by this 
determination’.
BSing: Impression management and the Darfur crisis. There was an element of BS in the 
administration’s claim that genocide was occurring while resolving that this would 
prompt no change in US policy. The initial accusations of genocide by US officials were 
not entirely indifferent to facts in Darfur. Well-intentioned officials with experience in 
Sudan pushed for an investigation and Powell’s genocide determination built on the pre-
liminary report of an investigation team (Natsios, 2012: 156–158; US Department of 
State, 2004a). The interpretation of the emerging evidence was nevertheless highly polit-
icized and interpreted through the frame of the Rwandan genocide. In fact, the report was 
highly flawed, with the Government Accountability Office (2006) later calling its find-
ings into doubt after an expert panel found it to have been based on ‘unrealistic assump-
tions’. Secretary Powell admitted that he knew the case was a shaky one, with his legal 
counsel advising him that ‘we can justify it one way, or we can justify it the other’ 
(Hamilton, 2011b).
One purpose of the genocide determination was impression management. The link to 
the Rwandan genocide activated a coalition that cut across typical political divides and 
mobilized important constituencies of evangelical Christian, Jewish and African- 
American groups, and students calling for tougher actions to end genocide in an election 
year (Heinze, 2007). Former special envoy to Sudan and UN ambassador John Danforth 
remarked that the statements about genocide were meant ‘for internal consumption’. It 
was, he said, ‘something that would appeal to the constituency’ mobilized around Sudan, 
particularly the evangelical right (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2005). After the 
2004 elections, the administration’s use of the genocide label diminished sharply 
(Prunier, 2007: 140).5 At least one senior UN official said that in a closed meeting shortly 
after the genocide Powell ‘as much as admitted it was made in response to domestic pres-
sure, that he was personally sceptical and that the issue was proving to be a distraction’ 
(author interview, 2 February 2010). A cynic would expect the order to publicly declare 
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Darfur a genocide to have come from the White House in response to polling data, but 
the decision was made by Secretary Powell without consulting other senior members of 
the administration or the president (Hamilton, 2011b). Indeed, the decision seems to 
have been more instinctive and sincere than calculating and cynical, expressing genuine 
frustration and moral outrage with Sudan — feelings shared by many in the administra-
tion, in the advocacy community and in the American audience beginning to mobilize 
around Darfur. The administration was not so much manipulating truths as failing to treat 
them with the legal and moral seriousness they deserved.
This was closer to BSing than hypocrisy, and distinct from lying. Unlike the govern-
ment of Sudan, which responded to the accusations by lying — that is, with statements 
its leaders knew to be untrue — Secretary Powell and President Bush were not trying to 
mislead anyone about the gravity of the atrocities. US leaders invoking genocide in 
coming years were faking the context, pretending to publicly rebuke Sudan and per-
suade allies abroad when they were more concerned with public perceptions at home. 
To burnish the administration’s human rights credentials in the wake of the Abu Ghraib 
torture scandal by talking tough on Darfur bordered on hypocrisy according to the 
administration’s critics. As influential activist John Prendergast argued, the genocide 
declarations were ‘less demonstrative of policy and more of a political ploy to be seen 
as being tough on the [Sudanese] regime’ (American Prospect, 19 June 2005). It was 
indeed hypocritical to neglect to mention the facts that senior US officials initially 
ignored and then suppressed reports of what was happening in Darfur,6 and that US 
officials were working closely with Sudan on counter-terrorism.7 However, the charge 
of hypocrisy, which relies on identifying efforts to hide the gap between values and 
actions, ignores the risks that taking further action entailed and the administration’s 
honesty about these risks. The initial genocide finding contained a clear statement that 
no new actions would follow and administration officials tended to reiterate their oppo-
sition to the deployment of US troops. President Bush raised the possibility of military 
action early but was convinced by advisers worried about the consequences (Washington 
Post, 29 October 2007). Most experts and activists agreed that military intervention 
would have aggravated the situation in Darfur and derailed the North–South peace pro-
cess. Thus, while the ambiguities of Washington’s priorities were defensible, for both 
activists and politicians it was far more expedient to BS with simplifications than grap-
ple with moral complexities.
Facts on the ground in Darfur, convincing other states about what was happening and 
building leverage in bargaining with Sudan eventually became less important than the 
broader impression the repeated invocation of genocide conveyed to American audi-
ences about the administration’s commitment to human rights. However, it exacted a 
diplomatic cost by separating the US from its allies at a crucial period and diminishing 
US credibility in negotiations with Sudan even as it foreclosed opportunities for rhetori-
cal entrapment.
Arguing: The unpersuasiveness of the genocide finding. Another explanation for the shift 
away from quiet diplomacy invokes the logic of arguing, interpreting the genocide dec-
laration as an attempt to persuade other states to support stronger measures. Secretary of 
State Powell’s legal adviser argued in a memo that the determination could act ‘as a spur 
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to the international community to take immediate and forceful actions to respond to 
ongoing atrocities’ (Taft, 2004: 3). Powell himself claims that he made the genocide 
determination to convince the Security Council to act (Hamilton, 2011a: 38). In advance 
of the genocide finding, American embassies in EU member states received a cable 
requesting them to push European governments for their ‘public support’ in order ‘to 
help build pressure on Sudan to act on its commitments’ (US Department of State, 
2004c). The genocide charge came just a day after the US circulated a draft resolution 
with proposed sanctions against Sudan and a ban on military flights over Darfur. How-
ever, the subsequent Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September was far weaker 
than American diplomats had pushed for, merely reiterating the Council’s previous 
demands and launching an official inquiry into the genocide.
There are multiple explanations for this failure to persuade other states, but the 
American case was not helped by the perception that US leaders were loose with realities 
in order to pander to public pressures. AU officials saw the genocide charge cynically, as 
a ‘political’ move made ‘under pressure’, and the Arab League’s special envoy to Sudan 
argued that ‘the Bush administration is against the Sudanese government. … They didn’t 
show us any evidence which convinced us’ (Hamilton, 2011a: 39). Even close American 
allies avoided using the term genocide, making it harder for the US to bring pressure to 
bear on other states on the Security Council in bargaining over the imposition of sanc-
tions against Sudan (Smith, 2010: 224). France, for example, rejected the term outright, 
claiming that Darfur was in the midst of a civil war (Prunier, 2007: 157). In the UK, 
where contingency planning for sending troops to Darfur in mid-2004 ran far ahead of 
US plans, officials still declined to use the term genocide (Williams, 2010: 199). Sweden’s 
Prime Minister observed that the label was ‘irrelevant’, while the Belgian Cooperation 
Minister commented that the term was ‘inappropriate and simplistic’ (Smith, 2010: 224). 
There was a consensus between the US and its allies that the situation in Darfur was dire 
and that they needed to avoid measures that would inflame the situation. But in the 
absence of comparable domestic pressure from activists, US allies perceived American 
statements as morally and factually suspect — particularly in the wake of debates over 
Iraq on the Council — because they seemed to be indifferent to the facts and the broader 
implications of invoking the genocide label.
Bargaining: Genocide and the credibility gap. Another interpretation considers the genocide 
charge as a way to increase bargaining leverage in two ways: first, by politicizing the 
issue and shrinking the domestic ‘win set’ of legislators, journalists and activists whose 
support the administration sought for its Sudan policy; and, second, by generating audi-
ence costs through public threats. Declassified documents indicate that the US had been 
privately pressuring Sudan over Darfur. Confidential notes on Secretary of State Pow-
ell’s visit to Khartoum in June 2004 reveal that he threatened a UN Security Council 
resolution against Sudan if there was not an ‘immediate improvement’. Employing a 
two-level bargaining strategy, Powell told his Sudanese counterpart that normalization of 
relations could not happen because ‘the US Congress would not allow the president to 
move forward without resolution of Darfur’ (US Department of State, 2004b). An audi-
ence cost interpretation would see the failure of these earlier attempts to privately 
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threaten the Sudanese government as proof that a more credible public threat had to be 
issued.
However, a number of facts cast doubt on the bargaining interpretation. First, the 
administration adopted the genocide label in order to reduce rather than increase domes-
tic pressure, allowing the administration to refocus its Sudan policy on cooperation over 
North–South peace and counter-terrorism (Prunier, 2007: 140). Second, patterns of vio-
lence indicate that increased international scrutiny over Darfur, including Powell’s pri-
vate pressure, was working. Sudan reined in militias in Darfur and improved humanitarian 
access in the summer of 2004, suggesting that the US genocide declaration had more to 
do with appeasing criticism at home than compelling Sudan to change its behaviour. 
Finally, there was no real threat beyond moral condemnation in the genocide finding’s 
insistence that no new actions were required. Whatever discursive logics US threats 
reflected, Sudan increasingly treated US threats as lacking in credibility. After the public 
genocide determination, the US pushed a series of unrealistic demands on Sudan at the 
UN (De Waal, 2007b: 1041). Sudan’s rulers, recognizing that US statements were aimed 
at an American audience rather than them, and consequently that Washington’s state-
ments would be ‘strong rhetorically but without much specific action’, hunkered down 
and weathered the storm (International Crisis Group, 2004: 7).
Rhetorical entrapment: Hollow victories?. Finally, the inability of activists to entrap the 
administration in its genocide language begs explanation. Though the mass movement 
around Darfur had not yet emerged, the administration was under considerable pressure 
to concede that genocide was under way. In proposing that the US act unilaterally if 
necessary to stop what the administration described as an ongoing genocide, some advo-
cates ignored the profound scepticism of unilateral uses of American power in the wake 
of the Iraq war (Williams and Bellamy, 2005). With experienced activists sharing the 
Bush administration’s assessment that unilateral coercive measures would make things 
worse rather than better in Sudan, activists found little hypocrisy to expose. BSing over 
genocide could thus be an effective rhetorical strategy for occupying the moral high 
ground, attaching American identity to a standard of legitimacy without the risks of act-
ing in its defence and deflecting accountability for outcomes to the more hesitant Euro-
pean states, China and the UN.8
The one clear instance of rhetorical entrapment for which activists can take some 
credit — which also owes much to European diplomatic pressure — was the US decision 
to abstain from vetoing referral of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). In January 2005, Ambassador to the United Nations John Danforth warned 
of a ‘train wreck’: ‘In view of our role in trying to put a stop to the human catastrophe in 
Darfur and our use of the term “genocide” to describe what has occurred there, we may 
be placed in an awkward and politically untenable position’ (Danforth, 2005). Having 
publicly defined Darfur as genocide and committed to punish its architects, and seeking 
to repair transatlantic ties after Iraq, Washington could not publicly refuse the Security 
Council referral despite the administration’s staunch opposition to the ICC. Activists 
welcomed Washington’s acquiescence to the referral, again reinforcing the impression of 
morally commendable action despite its limited impact on the situation in Darfur and 
deflection of accountability away from Washington.
14  European Journal of International Relations 0(0)
As the Bush administration’s entrapment in conceding to the ICC referral suggests, 
the strategy of dissembling in the genocide debate proved unhelpful diplomatically and 
backfired politically. During a crucial period, US statements sidetracked the interna-
tional reaction towards a debate over the legal characterization of the violence rather than 
measures to actually deal with it. When only US leadership could coordinate multilateral 
pressure on Sudan, the US was isolated from its allies and was not taken seriously by 
Sudan. In January 2005, an international inquiry into Darfur that the US had called for 
concluded that genocide was not in fact occurring given the difficulty of proving geno-
cidal intent (United Nations, 2005). The Commission’s non-finding on genocide became 
the story, rather than the report’s emphasis on the scale and seriousness of war crimes 
committed in Darfur, publically vindicating Sudan’s disingenuous claims and contradict-
ing the US position. Most consequentially, rather than appeasing activists, the invocation 
of genocide catalysed activism around Darfur, ultimately leading to delusions about what 
could and should be done in Darfur.
Protection and peace talks
The genocide declaration inadvertently raised expectations and fed collective illusions in 
the public. Intense media coverage framed the conflict in the highly emotive terms, tap-
ping into guilt over Rwanda and catalysing a mass movement that would increasingly 
influence policy. The pressures of a mobilized public increased demands for impression 
management and encouraged delusional thinking marked by an indifference towards 
realities on the ground in Sudan and in international diplomacy, most notably through 
calls for a force to protect civilians in Darfur.
Bullshitting: Activism and delusional thinking. In the year from October 2006, the Save Dar-
fur coalition spent $33.8 million on advertising to broaden the movement (Hamilton, 
2011a: 102), with remarkable effects on public interest and engagement. Figure 1 juxta-
poses the best estimates of mortality rates in Darfur with the explosive growth of interest 
around Darfur in the US, as measured by US-based Google searches for the term ‘Dar-
fur’. The figure demonstrates growing public interest in Darfur preceding the genocide 
declaration and then the explosive growth in relative public interest in Darfur during 
2006. The campaign to stop genocide in Darfur emerged in July 2004 after the one-sided 
mass killing had already peaked, then grew into a mass movement as the conflict trans-
formed into a much messier multisided insurgency.
Much advocacy increasingly misrepresented Darfur in order to prompt action on what 
was a tragically unexceptional African crisis. The campaign’s evocative but distorting 
emphasis on genocide was indifferent to changing patterns of violence in Darfur but was 
crucial to engaging public interest. As the coordinator of the campaign reflected, ‘after 
many hours mulling over policy alternatives, we realized that the closer we could get to a 
bumper sticker, the better we’d be as an organization’ (in Hamilton and Hazlett, 2007: 344). 
This meant portraying Darfur in terms of evil Arab villains, innocent African victims and 
heroic Western saviours, and calling for a protection force (Lanz, 2009: 8). The techniques 
of activism around Darfur — advertising, celebrity endorsement, online ‘clicktivism’, 
feel-good gestures and an emphasis on symbolic, media-friendly outcomes — lowered 
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the barriers to participation, but crowded out expert knowledge and critical voices. One 
tally of statements by prominent activist groups calculated that between April 2005 and 
August 2007, ‘assertions or predictions of deterioration’ appeared in 127 of 134 activist 
statements, notwithstanding improving conditions and a sharp decrease in violent deaths in 
Darfur (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 187). The campaign insisted that the administration echo 
its own doomsday portrayals. In April 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick 
cited estimates of 60,000 to 160,00 deaths in Darfur, earning him a public rebuke from 
activists then citing a figure of 400,000 deaths; today, the most accurate estimates vindicate 
Zoellick’s figures.
However inaccurate, the campaign’s framing proved highly appealing to the coalition 
of evangelicals, Jewish groups, students, and hawkish liberals that formed the Darfur 
advocacy movement’s core constituencies, foreign policy elites with little knowledge 
about Sudan, and ultimately the politicians who sought their support. Opinion polls con-
sistently found that ‘many Americans have only a loose grasp on the details of the 
Janjaweed massacres of Sudanese civilians’ (International Crisis Group, 2005: 1). But a 
lack of knowledge did not prevent Americans from endorsing stronger action. In one 
poll, even as 36% of respondents claimed not to be aware of events in Darfur at all (with 
only 18% indicating they were ‘very aware’), 80% were of the opinion that genocide or 
Figure 1. American public interest and violence in Darfur
16  European Journal of International Relations 0(0)
crimes against humanity were occurring and agreed that the US should establish a ‘no-fly 
zone’ over Darfur (International Crisis Group, 2005).
Indeed, calls for a no-fly zone illustrated the increasing tendency of US leaders to 
BS. The Save Darfur campaign called for the imposition of a no-fly zone in Darfur in 
full-page ads in the New York Times and the Washington Post on 14 February 2007. 
Senators Clinton, Obama and McCain all endorsed this call while campaigning in presi-
dential primaries during 2007. There had been calls for a no-fly zone dating back to 
2004, which arguably might have made sense given the levels of violence and patterns 
of attacks at the time. However, as noted Darfur expert Julie Flint observed, “A no-
flight zone would do little or nothing to address the reality that the greatest threat to 
civilians in Darfur today comes on the ground —  not from the air... A no-flight zone 
would be recklessly dangerous and would not address the real problems in Darfur.” 
(New York Times, 9 July 2007). Rather than skillfully manipulating the domestic politics 
of the campaign around Darfur, US leaders were sustaining collective deception in 
response to a powerful lobby making unrealistic and irrelevant demands, and perhaps 
even deceiving themselves.
Many US officials engaged in the actual diplomacy of arguing with allies and bargain-
ing with the Sudanese found the growing influence of advocacy groups in Washington 
frustrating (Stedjan and Thomas-Jensen, 2010: 172). As the US special envoy for Sudan 
Andrew Natsios (2007) complained in a personal memo to Deputy Secretary of State 
John Negroponte in 2007:
The media, beltway, think tanks, Congress, and advocacy groups believe that ‘the slaughter 
continues’ on a genocidal scale, a belief which is driving us towards policies which may not get 
us where we need to go to ‘save’ Darfur. The field data does not support the image. … Openly 
trying to correct this misperception is politically dangerous given the emotions around the issue 
and funding raising [sic] imperatives of the advocacy groups which rely on apocalyptic 
language. (See also Natsios, 2012: 151–158)
Unlike leaders further removed from the consequences of their words, officials with 
responsibility for dealing with Darfur could not be indifferent to the accuracy and impli-
cation of what they said. The same pattern also was true of humanitarian workers on the 
ground in Darfur: when the Save Darfur campaign called for a no-fly- zone, it provoked 
objections from humanitarian organizations whose operations to feed 2 million people in 
Darfur were endangered by what was effectively a call for war with Sudan (Hamilton, 
2011a: 133). Sam Worthington, head of InterAction, complained to Save Darfur in an 
email that the group’s advertising confused the public and damaged the relief effort: ‘I 
am deeply concerned by the inability of Save Darfur to be informed by the realities on 
the ground and to understand the consequences of your proposed actions’ (New York 
Times, 2 June 2007).
BSing over Darfur at this stage had a number of consequences. First, I argue that 
BSing undermined the US role in failed peace talks while the emphasis on genocide led 
the administration to focus on deployment of a protection force unable to make a differ-
ence in the absence of a workable peace agreement. Second, I argue that the late emer-
gence of a transnational campaign around Darfur eventually supported arguments 
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between the US and its allies and fostered a consensus on how to proceed — even if the 
consensus lacked a realistic plan for improving the situation. Third, I argue that the depo-
liticized and publicity-seeking character of activism that helped make Save Darfur a 
mass movement also made it easier for US officials to escape rhetorical entrapment.
Bargaining: Complicating mediation and negotiation. BSing over Darfur was intended for the 
American public mobilized around Darfur, yet parties to the conflict in Sudan paid close 
attention. Research suggests that the increased salience of Darfur in US politics should 
have made US mediation more effective through two mechanisms increasing American 
credibility: first, by evident bias towards the rebels, in terms of the closer alignment of 
their bargaining preferences; and, second, by the high degree of public concern for the 
issue displayed by American leaders (Favretto, 2009; Kydd, 2003). But statements exag-
gerating US resolve and the likelihood of intervention for domestic audiences contributed 
to the failure of a Darfur peace process by misleading Darfur’s rebels about the chances 
for Western intervention and regime change. Activists talked up the prospects of interven-
tion and encouraged rebels to keep up the fight rather than compromise (Cockett, 2010: 
235–241; Natsios, 2012: 187). As former UN special envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk observed, 
‘these young Americans were running all over Darfur encouraging the rebels to wait for 
intervention. The rebels would echo them, telling me “the worse it gets, the better it is for 
us”’ (interview, 25 February 2011). One advocacy group at talks in Abuja reportedly 
encouraged a key faction not to sign (Natsios, 2012: 187). During AU-mediated peace talks 
in Abuja, President Bush publicly supported an expanded NATO role in Darfur. But while 
Sudan’s canny leaders had stopped taking US threats seriously after almost two years of 
continuous threats with little follow-through, the uneducated, politically naive and inexpe-
rienced rebel leaders perceived calls for intervention and regime change as credible. The 
most popular rebel leader, Abdel Wahid, refused to sign without NATO troops and security 
guarantees ‘like in Bosnia’ for the peace agreement (Flint and De Waal, 2008: 222).
BSing may have prolonged the violence by encouraging rebel intransigence, perhaps 
even inadvertently contributing to a ‘moral hazard problem’ that raised expectations of 
intervention amongst rebel leaders in ways that made them reluctant to compromise 
(Johnston, 2007; Kuperman, 2009; cf. Bellamy and Williams, 2012). Despite a personal 
letter to the rebel leaders from President Bush and public threats from Deputy Secretary 
of State Robert Zoellick at the deadline for a settlement, a workable peace deal eluded 
mediators (De Waal, 2007a: 277). The Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May 2006 
by only one of the three major rebel factions. Rather than bringing peace, it increased 
fighting, fractured rebel movements and provided the Sudanese government with the 
cover of a Western-sponsored framework for peace that would never be implemented. 
President Bush hailed the flawed agreement as ‘the beginnings of hope for the people of 
Darfur’. Even as fighting escalated dramatically, the rebel leader who signed, Minnie 
Minnawi, was invited to Washington for a photo opportunity with the President. Yet the 
US never committed to the agreement, with repeated missed deadlines passing without a 
reaction from the administration (Hamilton and Hazlett, 2007: 364). But, then, the peace 
deal was less about a workable peace process than creating an agreement that would 
permit the deployment of UN peacekeepers in response to intense activist pressure to 
replace an AU mission seen as ineffective with a more robust protection force.
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Despite the failure to achieve a workable peace deal, the US continued to pursue a 
force to protect civilians from genocidal violence — notwithstanding the far more com-
plex reality of violence in Darfur. Washington circulated a draft resolution on deploying 
UN peacekeepers just three days after the agreement was signed. Sudan was unwilling to 
allow the UN to deploy, however, setting the stage for another diplomatic showdown. 
The UN force was not mandated until four months later, as Resolution 1706 on 31 August 
2006. Khartoum remained intransigent, dooming the mission to be the first in UN history 
that failed to deploy after being authorized. The impasse lasted another year, until a new 
‘hybrid’ AU–UN force was mandated with Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007. Though 
activists hailed this as a victory, it was a hollow one: with some superficial face-saving 
modifications, the resolution mandated essentially the same force as Resolution 1706 
11 months earlier and came almost three years after the violence had ebbed. It was 
another year before the mission deployed in force, attaining only half of its authorized 
strength by the end of 2008, four years after the worst violence and still without a work-
able peace deal.
There were multiple reasons for Washington’s lack of leverage over Sudan in bargain-
ing over deployment of the force. But the activist campaign’s increasing influence over 
US policy, and the extent to which it exaggerated American power, foreswore compro-
mise with a genocidal regime and overemphasized symbolic, media-friendly outcomes, 
contributed to weakening the US position. In an April 2007 speech at the US Holocaust 
Museum at the height of the impasse over deployment of the UN force, President Bush 
threatened stiffened sanctions against Sudan in retaliation for its refusal to allow the 
force to deploy: ‘The time for promises is over — President Bashir must act. … The 
world needs to act. If President Bashir does not meet his obligations to the United States 
of America, we’ll act’ (New York Times, 19 April 2007). Contrary to the mechanism of 
audience costs, however, Sudan’s leaders realized that repeated failure to follow through 
carried no real political costs for American leaders. When Sudan failed to comply, the US 
imposed relatively weak financial sanctions that merely extended existing measures 
rather than far more threatening capital market sanctions called for by some advisers 
(Hamilton, 2011a: 142). ‘One characteristic of US diplomacy was to leave [Sudan] with 
the sense that they didn’t have to do anything different because of the US’, argued former 
US ambassador to Sudan Gerard Galluci; ‘We were mostly talk’ (author interview, 19 
April 2011). Even as the US had no real sticks to back up its threats, activist pressure 
made it impossible to offer Sudan’s leaders carrots. Stephen Morrison, who worked on 
Sudan in the Clinton administration, observed: ‘the campaigners only have one gear and 
have a lock over Congress. It left our diplomacy helpless, left the US without the ability 
to put much on the table with Khartoum’ (Cockett, 2010: 220).
Arguing: A new consensus. In terms of arguing with allies, BSing proved much less detri-
mental to efforts to persuade allies during peace talks and in the debate over protection 
than it did during the genocide debate. The rise of transnational activism around Darfur 
in Europe meant that Western states were increasingly proceeding from the same basic 
understandings of the situation in Darfur and the policies to improve it. As groups such 
as Collectif Urgence Darfour in France and various faith and student groups in the UK 
exercised increasing influence, European leaders began to mirror the rhetoric of 
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US leaders, even if it was frequently as empty as what their American counterparts were 
saying. Outgoing UN Deputy Secretary General Mark Malloch Brown, for example, 
accused the US and UK governments of ‘posturing and grandstanding’ over Darfur, pur-
suing a type of ‘megaphone diplomacy’ in which ineffective threats were not backed by 
credible actions (The Independent, 29 September 2006). In France, Urgence Darfour 
became the most powerful campaign outside the US. France was one of the countries 
with the highest levels of public support for UN intervention in Darfur, at 55% (com-
pared to 48% in the US) (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2007). The French 
campaign pushed candidates in the 2007 French presidential election to commit to an 
international peace force and the establishment of humanitarian corridors, echoing the 
misguided emphasis placed on protection (Pohl, 2012). A consensus among Western 
powers nevertheless paid diplomatic dividends, if belatedly. Notably, it was crucial to 
breaking the long impasse over deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur 
in April 2007 by mobilizing pressure on China, which provided cover for Sudan on the 
Security Council.
Rhetorical entrapment: Depoliticization and shamelessness. For all its impact on the lan-
guage and substance of US policy, the campaign on Darfur failed to rhetorically entrap 
leaders. Rhetorical action relies on exposing hypocrisy. Yet even as the campaign over-
estimated the impact of US leadership to mobilize citizens, many activists privately con-
ceded that the administration had few good options in Darfur. Nor did activists ever 
really test the Bush administration’s commitments by exposing inconsistencies between 
bold talk and tepid actions. The decision to create as broad a movement as possible 
required the Save Darfur movement to concede to evangelical groups’ demands to stop 
criticizing the Bush administration (Hamilton, 2011a: 81), while the movement’s empha-
sis on demonstrating close access to high-level policymakers dampened criticism. The 
effect helped depoliticize Darfur domestically. Barack Obama and John McCain, for 
example, publicly agreed not to disagree on the issue during their campaign.
The shamelessness of some activist stunts also reduced its substantive influence with 
officials and influential Sudan experts. The performances sometimes seemed surreal. 
George Clooney addressed the UN Security Council at the invitation of the US, arguing 
that ‘You will simply need men with shovels and bleached white linen and headstones … 
this genocide will be on your watch’ (Washington Post, 15 September 2006). At the time, 
however, mortality rates in Darfur were a fraction of what they had been at the height of 
the killing. Thus, even as officials conceded to activist demands on symbolic issues, such 
as increased humanitarian funding, the ICC referral, appointment of special envoys and 
the imposition of weak sanctions, the Bush administration successfully resisted calls to 
do more to defend the norms activists considered to be at stake in Darfur.
Why bullshit?. If BSing proved detrimental to the pursuit of US interests, why was it so 
prominent in the American response? At its most cynically hypocritical, dissembling 
served an important propaganda purpose in distracting public attention from policies that 
were far more complicated — more complex practically insofar as Darfur was merely one 
file in the thick dossier of Washington’s Sudan and Africa policy, and more complex mor-
ally to the extent that the US was at the same time seeking the cooperation of the Sudanese 
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government on counter-terrorism and the North–South peace process. As George Orwell 
(2010 [1946]: 17) once observed, such policy priorities could indeed have been defended 
‘but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not 
square with the professed aims of the political parties’. Likewise, activists chose to over-
look inconvenient facts because admitting that Darfur exposed the limits of US power 
would have made for a poor strategy to build and sustain a campaign premised on making 
a difference through mass engagement. But the most important examples of BS appear to 
have been instances of earnest self- and collective deception, far more naive than cynical. 
Well-meaning activists put the promise of ending genocide within the reach of the average 
American and US leaders both indulged and succumbed to this fantasy. As a book authored 
by activist John Prendergast and actor Don Cheadle (2007: 98) argued:
The only way the US will take the kind of leadership necessary to end the horrors … is for there 
to be a political cost to inaction, at the voting booth. As American citizens increasingly raise their 
voices and write their letters about Darfur, the temperature has indeed risen. But not enough. We 
need to make it a little warmer, a little more uncomfortable for those politicians who would look 
away. Just a few more degrees. Just a few more thousand letters. It is, frankly, that simple.
This was an appealing story for citizens mobilized around Darfur. On the left, it assuaged 
anxieties about America’s image after the invasion of Iraq, detentions at Guantanamo 
and torture at Abu Ghraib; on the right, it bolstered a belief in the righteousness of 
American power and the moral failings of the UN and Europeans. Perhaps it was also a 
psychologically and politically convenient story for US leaders to tell themselves — by 
all accounts, President Bush was emotionally invested in Darfur, personally upset by 
activist critiques of his inability to do more, and regularly pushed a reluctant bureaucracy 
for stronger actions.9 But, frankly, it was not that simple. The story was wrong, and could 
only be believed by disregarding the complicated background of Darfur and the ethical 
foreign policy dilemmas it posed.
Conclusion
The analysis above contributes to critiques of activism around Darfur and locates an impor-
tant cause of these failures in the posture the campaign adopted towards truth (De Waal, 
2008; Mamdani, 2009). Save Darfur launched a campaign to fundamentally reorient for-
eign policy in the US through the creation of a historically unique mass movement. But this 
required simplifications, exaggerations and appeals to emotion that led to an indifference 
to the complex facts and context of the violence, despite many activists’ best intentions. For 
Mahmood Mamdani, one of the movement’s most trenchant critics, the campaign substi-
tuted ‘moral clarity for knowledge’ and allowed its participants to ‘feel virtuous even when 
acting on the basis of total ignorance’ (2009: 6). In constituting a set of understandings 
indifferent to realities, the politics around Darfur inadvertently made diplomatic problem- 
solving secondary to managing advocacy pressures. The costs of dissembling were felt 
most immediately in Darfur and secondarily in relation to the pursuit of American interests 
in Sudan, compared to which the meagre damage to America’s reputation abroad or civic 
life at home has been slight. The risk, however, is that because BSing appears relatively 
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harmless from our perspective, we fail to learn the right lessons. Indeed, the debate opened 
up by #Kony2012, the controversial activist campaign by Invisible Children to capture 
Joseph Kony in Uganda, illustrates once more the hazards of ignoring context and com-
plexity in the attempt to generate a broad public outcry (Taub, 2012).
The episode also generates two sets of insights for theoretical research, beginning with 
implications for debates on particular discursive processes. The analysis draws attention 
to the coincidence and interaction of multiple discursive strategies. The failures of US 
diplomacy around Darfur were shaped in part by the perception that US officials were 
playing loose with the truth and focused more on impression management for domestic 
audiences than devising a plan for dealing with Darfur. American arguments with allies 
fell flat when US activism outpaced efforts in other countries, drawing attention to the role 
of trustworthiness, credibility and legitimacy in persuasion (Grobe, 2010). Activists were 
indeed late to realize the importance of transnational advocacy in multilateral diplomacy 
(Hamilton and Hazlett, 2007: 365), but the more coordinated diplomacy that followed the 
rising political influence of transnational advocacy in Europe supports the finding that 
activists can indeed promote consensus (Deitelhoff, 2009). However, the case shows that 
misdirected activism can have ambivalent or negative effects on moral progress (Bob, 
2005). In terms of bargaining, the analysis here is consistent with recent work calling for 
attention to self-deluding beliefs and the role of domestic interest groups (Lake, 
2010/2011). It also casts doubt on audience cost mechanisms (Snyder and Borghard, 
2011) insofar as the mobilized public cared more about the feel-good rhetoric of 
Washington’s Sudan policy than about consistency. While going public in crisis bargain-
ing might sometimes reveal credible information, when this takes the form of BSing, it 
makes for transparent bluffing abroad, even if it works at home. In terms of rhetorical 
action, the case indicates that the causal force of shaming is more limited, even in the 
domestic context, than this literature supposes. Arguments that invoke norms and princi-
ples shamelessly, inconsistently and without regard for commonly accepted understand-
ings are unlikely to be effective in shaming others, especially if those meant to feel shame 
share the target’s interest in sustaining the audience’s delusions.
The findings have broader implications for how we think about communication, 
deception and truth more generally. What ultimately matters is less the contrasting theo-
retical logics of different discursive practices, which overlap in many speech acts, but the 
conditions under which forms of discourse are effective and the ways in which one type 
of speech undermines others. Research has focused on arguing, bargaining and rhetorical 
action but has largely missed their different orientations to truthfulness. Attention to the 
performative logic of BSing, and the uncritical way people respond to it, fits a broader 
shift towards recognizing that many important instances of social action reflect neither 
instrumental nor normative calculations. Recognition of indifference to truth opens new 
possibilities, calling attention to how rational instrumentalism discounts cognitive biases 
and heuristics, reasoned truth-seeking overlooks emotion, and shaming misses the pos-
sibility that audiences willingly ignore gaps between words and deeds. In 2006, after 
failing to prevent the worst violence in Darfur, President Bush defended his record on 
Sudan: ‘Our country was the first country to call what was taking place a genocide, 
which matters — words matter’ (New York Times, 18 February 2006). He was right, 
words do matter, just not in the way he intended.
22  European Journal of International Relations 0(0)
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Benjamin Pohl, Francesco Ragazzi, Klaas van Walraven, members of 
the Amsterdam VIEW International Relations working group and anonymous reviewers for con-
structive comments on drafts of this article, as well as numerous interviewees, including those 
remaining anonymous, who gave generously of their time.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or 
not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
1 See Carson (2010: 58–63) for a critique of this definition.
2 For decision-making, see Jervis (1976), Vertzberger (1990) and Duelfer and Dyson (2011). On 
public competence, see Lippmann (1922), Mueller (1973) and Holsti (2004).
3 On hypocrisy, see Shklar (1984), Krasner (1999), Chomsky (2000), Glaser (2006), Owens 
(2007) and Waever (2008).
4 See Müller (2004). These do not of course exhaust logics of social action, including recent 
attention to practice and habit. See Pouliot (2008) on practice and Hopf (2010) on habit.
5 See Nicolas Kristof, ‘Day 141 of Bush’s silence’, New York Times, 31 May 2005.
6 Officials who tried to raise the issue of Darfur at the UN found their efforts blocked. Multiple 
author interviews. See also Cockett (2010: 196–198).
7 See, for example, ‘Official pariah Sudan valuable to America’s war on terrorism’, Los Angeles 
Times, 29 April 2005; ‘US relies on Sudan despite condemning it’, Los Angeles Times, 11 June 2007.
8 As David Chandler (2003) notes, ethical foreign policy is ideal for shoring up the moral author-
ity of governments precisely because there is no accountability for outcomes.
9 See, for example, ‘US promises in Darfur don’t match actions’, Washington Post, 29 October 
2007; Hamilton (2011a: 78) Curiously, Bush’s biography (2010) makes no mention of Darfur.
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